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Introduction
The disincentive effects of social insurance systems on individual labour supply are well documented, but knowledge how they affect family labour supply is scarcer. We use a Swedish reform in the sickness insurance system to investigate if an increase in a partner's benefit level spills over to spousal labour supply. In theory, for couples with a common household budget such an effect operates through an income effect which consists of three components: 1) an insurance income effect which arises since the partner's higher benefit level alters the cost of future illness by the partner.
1 If leisure is a normal good this will increase spousal sick reporting regardless of whether the partner directly reacts to the reform;
2) a direct income effect since an increased benefit level can change the partner's sick reporting and thus also his/her earnings. The sign of this effect is a priori unknown since the partner's earnings change can go in either direction, and 3) a joint leisure effect that occurs if a couple wants to spend more leisure time together. 2 Decomposing a disincentive effect into different mechanism has proven to be empirically difficult (Autor and Duggan 2007) .
To date results indicate that partners' sickness insurance spill over to spousal labor supply; the spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner's benefit is estimated to 0.36 (own labour supply elasticity in the unemployment insurance is close to 1; see Krueger and Meyer 2002) . The major part of this effect is an insurance income effect.
The reform and data
Sweden has a compulsory publicly administered sickness insurance program funded primarily through a payroll tax levied on employers. Income compensation constitutes the major part of this program, though the replacement rate has varied over time. In December 1987 it was increased for spells lasting less than a week and the waiting day was abolished. To motivate our differences-in-difference strategy we display the development of log duration for treated an untreated in Figure 1 . The trends are similar between the groups up until 1987, but after the reform the duration increases for those treated relative to the untreated. The direct effect of the reform is investigated by Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie (2010). They show that the reform increased the incidence by 11 percent while it decreased duration. This is not surprising since the reform made it less costly for a worker to be absent for short periods once the waiting day was abolished. In fact, the net effect of the reform on the total number of days of sickness absence was a 3 percent reduction. However, it important to note these types of incentives were not present for the population we studied in this paper since they were only indirectly affected.
Estimations and results
Our first analysis explores the distributional effects on duration by estimating the following linear probability difference-in-differences (DD) model: Figure 2 displays the DD-estimates. The reform had no impact on the probability to start a sick spell; the effect is insignificant at the threshold 1. But it increased the duration of ongoing spells up to around 40 days, with the largest effects for spells fewer than eight days; those days for which the reform de facto changed the replacement rate. One explanation for the lack of effect on incidence is that starting a new spell appears to mark a worse career signal than merely continuing an ongoing spell with an additional day. It clearly can be more costly for the employer to adjust work plans and find a substitute for a new sick case than for a person who has already been on sick leave for a while. Note: Standard errors are clustered on a time-group level.
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The fact that incidence is unaffected by the reform increases our confidence in analyzing positive spells. We proceed to right-censor these at 50 days to avoid influences from extreme outliers, employing the following DD regression model:
Y igt is log duration of sick spells, and X it are individual covariates included to both improve precision and control for any potential composition changes. 6 The total causal reform effect on duration, δ, measures whether spouses to treated partners changed in durations after the reform relative to spouses with untreated partners. We decompose this total income effect into three parts. First, we ignore spells for couples that overlap in time (8.4 percent of the total sample) in order to evaluate the relative importance of a joint leisure effect. Second, we separate out the direct income effect by estimating equation (2) controlling for partners' income. 7 Since partners' income is endogenous, we instrument this variable with the partners' pre-reform income in 1986 using 2SLS.
The results are reported in the first column of Table 2 . The estimated total effect reveal that spousal duration significantly increased by 3.2 percent when partners received a higher sickness benefit. Omitting couples with overlapping cases doesn't change this result, making it more reasonable to ignore the endogeneity with joint leisure. When we control for the partner's income the effect is reduced to 2.6 percent, implying that the direct income effect is 0.6 percent. 8 We conclude that generally the insurance income effect is highly relevant for spousal labor supply.
To quantity the effect we reestimate the model using only treated spouses married to local governmental workers, as we know that their replacement rate increased by 11 percent.
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The estimated effects are reported in the second column of Table 2 . The total reform effect is 4 percent, implying an elasticity of spousal sick reporting with respect to the partner's benefit of 0.36. The insurance effect is estimated to be 2.5 percent implying, an insurance elasticity of 0.23. 6 The covariates are age, whether the spouse is a wife, living in an urban area and household size. Including these covariates hardly change the estimated reform effect. 7 It should be noted that a direct income effect is potentially relevant because we found evidence that partners' income was affected by the reform. 8 The instrument has a t-value of 537 in the first stage. 9 For workers above the income cap the change in replacement rate is smaller. This group is less than 5 percent of the sample, and the reform effect is unchanged when they are excluded. Finally, we estimate separate reform effects for low-and high income partners. The results (available from the authors upon request) show that spouses of low income partners reacted more to the reform than those of high income partners. This strengthens the finding that the insurance income effect is important, which is not surprising inasmuch as the need to insure against future economic shocks is likely to be higher for low income families.
